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BANK CHECK-DEPOSIT FOR COLLECTION-CORRESPONDENT BANK-DEPOS-
ITOR'S AGENT-WILSON V. CARLINVILLE NATIONAL BANK, 58 N. E. 250 (111).-
A customer deposits with his bank a check for collection. The depositary
transmits the check for collection to its correspondent bank, using reasonable
care in selecting such correspondent bank. Held, the correspondent bank be-
comes the agent of the depositor for such collection, and the depositary is not
liable to the depositor for any negligence on the part of the correspondent bank.
The authorities on this point, namely, whether the correspondent bank is
agent for the depositary bank or the depositor, are in direct conflict. The
sounder rule seems to be that it is agent for the depositary bank.. This is the
rule in England, United States Courts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New
Jersey, New York, and Ohio. But the following States hold that the corres-
pondent bank is agent of the depositor: Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina,
Tennessee, Wisconsin. See 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 810.
CARRIERS-LABILITY FOR APPROPRIATION OF GOODS-CONTRIBUTiON-LEI-
PERT ET AL V. GALVESTON L. & H. Ry. Co., 57 S.W. 899 (Tex.)-Goods
were wrongfully delivered by a connecting carrier to a steamship company in-
stead of to the owner, and were carried to another place. The said company,
having had notice of the ownership, claimed a lien for freight and sold the
goods. Held, liable for conversion.
Counsel for defendant insisted that there could be no liability, as the law
required the company, as a common carrier, to receive and transport goods
tendered by connecting lines ; however, the company was held liable on the
ground that a carrier has no lien when the property is received from a wrong-
ful holder, or from one not authorized to ship. 5 Am. & Eng. Ency. 403. Sal-
tus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 275. This case is distinguishable from Price v. Rail-
road Co., 21 Pac. 188, and Patten v. Railroad Co., 29 Fed. 590, as the carrier
had no authority, either as a general or a special agent, to ship the goods be-
yond the destination named in the bill of lading. As they were joint feasors,
the steamship company is not entitled to contribution from the connecting
carrier.
CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS--USE OF RAILROAD GROUNDS-CONTRACT-B. & A.
R.R. Co.v. BROWN, 58 N. E. 189 (Mass.).-In this case the Massachusetts rule
adopted in RailroadCo. v. Tripp, 147 Mass, 35,17 N.E. 89, is followed. This rule
isthat a railroad company maygive a hackmantheexclusiverighttosolicitpas-
sengers upon its premises. Railroad Co. v. Tripp has been followed in Godbont
v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 81 N. W. 835 (Minn.). But. aside from these two
cases, the authorities are unanimous to the effect that no exclusive privilege
can be given. State v. Reed, 76 Miss. 211; McConnell v. Pedigo & Hayes, 92
Ky. 465; Railroad Co. v. Langlois, 9 Mont. 419; Cravens v. Rogers, 101 Mo.
247; Hack & Bus Co. v. Sootsina, 84 Mich 194; Hedding v. Gallagher et al,
69 N. H. 650, 46 At. 96, 9 YALE LAW JOURNAL 231. The principle deciding
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these cases is that to give effect to such regulation would be to allow the rail-
road company to control the transportation of passengers and merchandise
beyond its own lines, and to establish a monopoly not granted by its charter,
which might be solely for its own benefit and not for the benefit of the public.
CARRIERS-SHIPMENT--GARNISHMENT--FFET---BALDWIN ET AL V. GREAT
NORTHERN RAILWAY Co., 83 N. W. 986 (Minn.).-A carrier received freight for
shipment from a place within a State to a place without, placed the same in a
car for transportation and issued a bill of lading therefor. A third party then
served on it a garnishee summons against the owner of the goods. Held, that
this did not compel the company to forego the right to transport the same,ior
did it excuse or authorize an unreasonable delay in forwarding the property.
On grounds of public policy it is held by the weight of authority that car-
riers cannot be held as garnishees for property where it is in actual transit
when the garnishment process is served. 14 Am. & Eng. Eric. 810. Contra,
Landa v. Holick, 129 Mo. 663, citing with approval Adams v.Scott, lO4,Mass.
164. The courts are pretty well divided as to whether the exemption extends
to goods not actually in transit, but the majority seem to hold that it does
not. In Bates v. R. R., 60 Wis. 296, the Court expressly declined to decide the
question. However in the case at bar, approving and following the rule laid
down in Stevenst v. Eastern Ry. Co., 63 N. W. 256, it was held that property
in carrier's hands, though not yet shipped, was not subject to garnishment.
CARRIERS--INJURY TO EMPLOYEE-LIABILITY-CHATTANOGA RAPID TRAN-
SIT Co. v. VENABLE, 58 S. W. 861.-In violation of the railroad's rules a con-
ductor allowed an employee of the road to ride without demanding a pass or
fare from him. Held, that such an employeeriding openly, was not atrespasser
and railroad was liable for injuries resulting from a collision.
A railroad company has the right to make reasonable rules regulating the
running of its road, and such rules cannot be abrogated by its employees.
Railroad Co. v. Wilson, 88 Tenn. 306. 4 Elliott, R. R. Sec. 1500. Thus if de-
fendant had prevailed upon theconductor to carry him in violation of a known
rule of the company, no recovery would be permitted. Railroad Co. v. Haily,
94 Tenn. 383. The most that the conductor did in this case was to call the
attention of the defendant to the rule referred to above. The presumption is
that a 'person so traveling with knowledge of the conductor, and without in-
terference from him, is a passenger and entitled to all a passenger's priv-
ileges. 4 Elliott R. R. Sec. 1578. Jacobim v. R. R. Co., 20 Minn. 125; O'Don-
nell v. R. R. Co., 59 Pa. St. 239; Washburn v. R. R. Co., 3 Head (Tenn.) 638.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE or PARET-PERIL OF CHmD--REscuE BY
MOTHER-WEST CHICAGO ST. Ry. v. LIDERMAN, 58 N. B. 367. (1ll.)-The
mother permitted the child while on the street to let go of her hand, and run
onto defendant's tracks. This suit was for damages she sustained in attempt-
ing to save it from being run over by a car. The contention of defendant was
that permitting a child three years old to play in the street where cars were
operated was negligence as a matter of law. Held, that as a matter of law it
was not negligence per se, but was fairly debatable. Fox v. Ry. Co., 118 Cal.
55; Weeks v. Ry. Co., 56 Cal. 513.
But in Ry. Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, it was held that a person's adminis-
trator could not recover for his death which resulted from his attempt to save
a boy, who by negligence of deceased, was on the trestle of a railroad.
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CORRECTING JUDGMENT--SURPLLUs-LIEN-STRAUSS EL AL V. BENDIHjIM,
66 N. Y. Supp. 247.-Ajudgment for the specific performance of a land con-
tract directed the sale of the land by areferee in case of disability of defendant,
the vendee, to pay the contract price with costs, and awarded defendant any
surplus arising after deducting taxable costs and disbursements. Held, that
the surplus raised by a sale to a stranger could not be divested from defend-
ant to plaintiffs by an amendment of the original judgment, which was cor-
rect, or by a supplementary direction of the Court, though the surplus was
gained through plaintiff's efforts at an expense equal to the surplus-they hav-
ing employed counsel in proceedings to enforce the stranger's purchase, such
agreement being a simple contract only, creating no lien on the surplus.
Amendment can only be allowed for purposes of making therecord conform
to the truth, not to reverse or change the judgment. Sec. 56 Black onjudg-
ments. The law does not authorize correction ofjudicial errors, under pretense
of correcting clerical errors. Sec. 70 Freeman on.Judgments. Whatever ethical
grounds the plaintiffs may have, by agreement with the defendant that he
should contribute to the expense of the proceeding, they do not reach the
legal effect of a lien on the surplus, but merely create a simple contract right.
DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT-CosTs-COLLUSIVE SETTLEMENT-ATTORNEY'S
RIGHTS-NATIONAL EXHIBITION CO. V. CRANE, 66 N. Y. Supp. 361.-Defendant,
who had become irresponsible, made a collusive agreement with plaintiffcor-
senting to a discontinuance of the action, without payment to the attorney
of his fees, to which discontinuance the defendant's attorney objected. Held,
that the Court had power to protect the attorney,-as an officer of the court,
in his inchoate right to fees by requiring payment thereof as a condition of
discontinuance. Van Brunt, P. J., and Ingraham, J., dissenting.
Little discussion on this point can be found in books, as the Courts have
seldom exercised this power. While no cases, as far as we know, cast doubt
upon this practice, it seems to be supported in the adjudicated cases. Wor-
mer v. Canovan, 7 Lans. 36. A prerequisite of the exercise of this right by
the Courtsis that the stipulations of discontinuance must have been collusively
entered into by the parties and with intent to deprive the attorney of a right
which in ordinary course he might enforce. Randall v. Van Wagenen, 115 N.
Y. 528. The cases show that there are two methods followed by the Courts in
protecting the attorney under these circumstances, the one being the payment
of costs as a condition of discontinuance, as in the case under discussion; the
other is by permission granted the attorney to proceed to judgment and
thereby perfect his lien for fees. Talcott v. Bronson, 4 Paige 501. We think
the first method is the better, in that further litigation is dispensed with.
FIRE INSURANCE-LOCATION OF INSURED PROPERTY-LEVENTHAL v. HOMEINS. Co., 66 N. Y. Sup. 502.-Held, a policy of insurance covering loss by fire
on all personal property located in a certain residence did not extend to valua-
ble garments in the back yard on a clothes line. Baler v. Insurance Co., 80
Hun. 309.
GUARANTY-NOTICE OF ACCEPTANCE-GERMAN SAVINGS BANK v. DRAKE
ROOFING Co., 83 N. W. 960. (Ia.)-To induce a bank to extend credit, an in-
strument not signed at the bank's request nor in its presence, recited that the
signers guaranty the payment of all indebtedness which may accrue from the
principal to the bank within a certain time, not exceeding a certain sum.
There was no consideration except the future advancements. The instrument
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was delivered to the bank and the principal drew more money. Held, a mere
offer of guaranty requiring notice of acceptance by the bank to bind the
guarantors.
Although some of the rules relating to acceptance of guaranty are fairly
well settled, there is a great diversity of opinion as to their application to
special circumstances. Two good reasons are advanced for requiring such no-
tification: First, that the so-called guaranty is a mere proposition and the
contract is not complete until the minds of the parties have met through ac-
ceptance; second, that the party making the offer is entitled to know his re-
sponsibility. Edmonston v. Drake, 5 Pet. 624. Davis v. Wells, 104 U. S.159.
Contra, Douglas v. Howland, 24 Wend. 35. Chief Justice Marshall has held
that notice must be given the guarantor even though his proinise be absolute
in its terms. Russel v. Clarke's Exrs., 7 Cranch 69. See also Craft v. Isham,
13 Conn. 28. Contra, Paige v. Parker, 8 Gray 211. Whitney et al v. Groot,
24 Wend. 82. In the present case the Court endorsed the authoritative rule an-
nounced by Justice Grey in Machine Co. v. Richards, 115 U. S. 524, and required
a notification of acceptance.
HAwKERS AND 'PEDDLERs-RIGHTS OF ALIENS-EQUAL PROTECTION OF
LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE V. MONTGOMERY, 47 Atl. 165 (Me.).-
Respondent, a citizen of the United States, was found guilty of peddling certain
classes of goodd without a license, in violation of a statute of the State of
Maine, which provides that the "secretary of state shall grant a license" for
peddling "to any citizen of the United States * * * but such license shall be
granted to no other person." Held, that the statute is opposed to the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
From the wording of the statute it follows that an alien cannot obtain a
license to peddle. But it has been held repeatedly that an alien comes
within the meaning of "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment, and
therefore cannot be denied the "equal protection of the law." Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150. (Cooley on Const. Lim.,
sixth ed., page 213.)
INTOxICATING LIQUORS-MUNICIPAL 0RDINANCES-LICENSE FEEs-BoARD
OF COUNCIL OF HARRODS3URG v. RENFRO, 58 S. W. 795.-By a city ordinance
a license fee of $600 was fixed for selling liquor on anystreet withthe exception
of Main street. The fee on this street was placed at $900. Held, that such an
ordinance was invalid to the extent that it discriminated against the liquor
business conducted on Main street.
The invalidity of such an ordinance is based upon the fact that it is an ex-
ample of special and local legislation. The powers granted to a municipal cor-
poration are specially enumerated and no powers are to be implied which are
not thus enumerated. Somerville v. Dickerman, 127 Mass. 272. Francis v.
Troy, 74 N. Y. 338. The legislature itself could clearly not be allowed to exer-
cise a power so unequal and discriminating, and thus a double reason why
such a power should not be presumed.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-ANDERSON V. STEINREICH, 66 N. Y. Sup. 498.-
Where a landlord, the defendant, gave plaintiff a suite of rooms and a certain
monthly sum for services rendered by plaintiff, held, the relation of landlord
and tenant did not exist.
In the present case the fact that the services rendered by plaintiff were per-
formed in the same building in which her services were rendered as janitress,
was held by the Court to constitute the entire relationship into one of master
and servant. White v. Sprague, 9 N. Y. St. Rep. 220.
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LICENsE-DELIVERY OF G ODS BY AGENT-INTER-STATE COMMERCE-STATE
ET AL V. CALDWELL, 373 S. E. 178 (N. C.)-A license tax was required of all
persons selling or delivering picture frames or pictures. This applied to agents
who received the pictures and frames from their firm in another State. Held,
not in violation of the United States Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8.
The principles governing this case are authoritatively stated in Robbins v.Selby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489. The distinction the Court draws
between goods delivered by the foreign firm directly to the consumer and indi-
rectly through the agent seems doubtful.
MASTER AND SERVANT-EIGHT-HOUR DAY LAw-OVERTIME-EXTRA COM-
PENsATION-GRAY v. HALL, 66 N. Y. Sup. 500.-Chapter 385, Laws of 1870 of
New York, enacts the customary eight-hour-per-day law, but permits overtime
contracts for compensation. Plaintiff was employed under an agreement to
receive a certain sum per day and proportionately for parts of a day. Held,
work of over eight hours per day did not entitle him to additional
compensation.
This seems a close question. Plaintiff, by agreement, was to receive a cer-
tain sum per day and proportionately for parts of days; and the statute pro-
vides a day to be eight hours, and plaintiff worked in excess of this time. But
the Court held that the clause "part of a day '" applied only to days on which
plaintiff worked less than eight hours, and denied him relief. McCarthy
v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 1.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ALIENATING HUSBAND'S AFFECTIONS-WIFE'S RIGHT
OF ACTION-BETSER v. BETSER, 58 N. E. 249 (fll.)-Action by wife for aliena-
tion of husband's affections. Held, the reason the wife was not allowed to
maintain this action at common law was, that she could not sue without join-
ing her husband as plaintiff. The reason of the rule is abrogated bythe statute
which allows a married woman to sue without joining her husband. There-
fore she may maintain the action.
The law on this point is in an unsettled state in the United States. In Con-
necticut, it is held that a married woman may maintain the action indepen-
dently of any statute. Foote v. Card, 58 Conn. 4. In other States it is held,
as in the present case, that if a statute allows a married woman to sue alone,
she may maintain this action. Mehrhoffv. Mehrhoff, 26 Fed. Rep. 13; Logan
v. Logan, 77 Ind. 558; Clow v. Chapman, 125 Mo. 101, 46 Am. St. Rep. 468;
Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584; Gernerd v. Gernerd, 185 Pa. St. 233, 39
At. 884; Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621. In Massachusetts it is held
that no such action can be maintained unless adultery is alleged. Houghton
v. Rice, 174 Mass. 366, 54 N. E. 843; Drocker v. Drocker, 98 Fed. Rep. 702.
Maine and Wisconsin are the only States which do not allow a wife to main-
tain this action. Duiffes v. Duffles. 76 Wis. 374; Morgan v. Martin, 92 Me.
190. See also on this subject, 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Laws (second ed.) 864.
JURISDICTION-CIRcuIT COURT oF APPEALS--CASE INVOLVING A FEDERAL
QUESTION-AMERICAN SUGAR REFINING CO. V. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, 104
Fed. 2.-Action by the City of New Orleans to recover of the American Sugar
Refining Company a license fee. Taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals and
dismissed because it presented a case requiring the construction and applica-
tion of the United States Constitution.
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It is now the rule that in all cases which are controlled by the construction
and application of the Constitution of the United States, a direct appeal lies
to the Supreme Court. Carter v. Roberts. 20 Sup. Ct. 713. In the present
case the pleadings showed that the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts did not
rest entirely upon constitutional construction. It was based on diverse
citizenship. In view of this the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals declin-
ing to take jurisdiction would seem to be unwarranted, and the more so since
the original dispute was not one in which the parties demanded aconstruction
of the United States Constitution. New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U. S. 411.
MASTER AND SERVANT-RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR-CRAVEN V. BLOOMINGDALE
-66 N. Y. Sup. 525.-Defendant's servant delivered goods to plaintiff which
were bought from defendant. Said goods had a C. 0. D. mark for an excessive
amount. Plaintiff offered the right amount of the charge and refused to give
up possession. Held, defendant's servant in having plaintiff arrested for theft,
acted within the scope of his employment and bound his master in damages,
said servant's employment being the driving of a delivery wagon and deliver-
ing good§.
The boundary line in nearly all jurisdictions is indistinct as to what consti-
tutes the division between acts committed by a servant which are within and
those without the scope of his employment. The present case seems an ex-
treme one. In Allen v. London, etc. Ry. Co., L. R., 62 B. 65, however, the
same rule is announced, but in Walton v. New York, etc. Co., 139 Mass. 556,
a different doctrine is stated. See Lubliner v. Tiffany & Co., 66 N.Y. Sup. 659.
MASTER AND SERVANT-CARE OF MASTER-SULLIVAN V. POOR ET AL.-66
N. Y. Sup. 409.-Where an elevator was defective, but the proprietor had an
inspector's certificate stating it to be safe, and plaintiffs husband was killed by
such defect, held, no recovery.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES--DECEIT-SIGAFUS v. PORTER, 21 Supreme Ct. 34
-In an action for $1,000,000 damages forfalse represetations as to the value
of a mine, it was held that the measure of damages was the amount the per-
son defrauded was actually out of pocket by reason of the fraud. Not the
represented value minus the actual value, but the price paid minus the actual
value. Justice Brown and Justice Peckam dissented.
The Court followed the rule of Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cases 337. That is,
actual loss by the deceit. The other rule, that the difference between the ac-
tual value and the representative value is the measure, is the iule laid down in
Morse v. Hutchins, 102 Mass. 439.
MEASURE OF DaMaGES-NuIsaNCES--VaNSIcLEN V. CITY OF NEW YORK,
66 N. Y. Sup. 555.-Where defendant maintained a nuisance in the street in
front of plaintiff's property, held, plaintiff's measure of damages, after abat-
ing the nuisance, was the diminished rental value of the property.
The usual rule in such cases is the market value of the property, Colony
Ry. Co. v. Evans, 6 Gray (Mass.) 25, but the present case is strongly sup-
ported by Francis v. Schoelkopf, 53 N. Y. 152. See Edg. Dam. (eighth ed.)
sec. 1203.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-GREATER NEW YORK CHARTER-CORPORATION
COUNSEL-JUDGMENT--POWER TO CONFESs-BusH v. O'BRIEN ET AL 58 N.E.
106 (N. Y.)--Suit in equity by a taxpayer, to restrain the collection of ajudg-
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ment obtained against the city upon confession of judgment by the corpo-
ration counsel. Held, the corporation cousel had no power to confess judg-
ment against the city, as the power to settle claims resides in the comptroller,
and collection of the judgment should be restrained. Three judges dissent
upon the ground that corporation counsel did have such power, and further
that a judgment cannot be attacked in equity on the ground that it was
entered without authority, but the proceeding must be by motion in the ac-
tion resulting in the judgment.
It seems plain from the charter provisions and general law that the corpo-
ration counsel had no power to confess judgment. San Francisco v. LeRoy,
138 U. S. 656. But the mode of attacking the judgment is without prece-
dent. The Court in the original action had jurisdiction and confession of
judgment was a mere irregularity for which the judgment cannot be im-
peached. Black, Judgments, 261. In the original action a motion to set aside
judgment was made and denied. Where such a motion has been made and
refused equity will not interfere by injunction. Black, Judgments, 363. No
fraud or collusion in obtaining judgment was alleged nor was it denied that
the city was justly indebted.
PROXIMATE CAUSE-INJURIES-NEGLIGENCE-EVANSVILLE, ETC. RY. Co. v.
WELCH, 58 N. E. 88 (Ind.)-A man was struck by appellant's engine and
hurled against appellee, who was injured in consequence. Held, on appeal,
the plaintiff could not recover, as the defendant's negligence was not the prox-
imate cause of his injury. To same effect see Wood v. Penn. R.R. Co., 177
Pa. St. 306.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PART PAYMENT OF PRICE-RAYMOND v. COLTON,
104 Fed. 219.-Plaintiff was vice-president, general manager, and director of
a joint stock mercantile company. Defendant was a stockholder in the com-
pany. Plaintiff by parol agreement would "get out" of the company in con-
sideration of receiving one-fourth of the goods owned by the company. Sev-
eral days after this arrangement plaintiff handed his resignation to defend-
ant and now brings suit for the goods. Held, no such part payment as to
take the contract out of the Statute of Fraud
The decision in this case turns upon the peculiar wording of the New
York statute. The general rule is that time of payment is unimportant-
Davis & Moore, 13 Me. 424. And we understand that it is not authoritat-
ively settled that payment must be made before suit is commenced. The
New York statute demands that the payment should be made at the same
time as the contract. Jackson v. Tuppe; 101 N. Y. 575. A reaffirmance of
the contract at the time the part payment is made will satisfy the statute.
The facts in this case would seem to bring it under this last proposition.
TAxATION-Ex8MPTIONS-YouNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN Ass'N OF OMAHA V.
DOUGLAS COUNTY, 83 N. W. 924 Neb. A Young Men's Christian Association
owned a building and used all of it except the first floor, which was rented
for business purposes. Held, that the first floor not being used exclusively for
educational, charitable, or religious work, was not exempt from taxation un-
der the general revenue laws of the State.
There are two views held as to exemptions of this nature. The first holds
that the exemption is dependent upon the ownership of the property, regard-
less of its use. 12 Am. & Eng. Ency. 325. University of South v. Skidmore,
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87 Term, 155. In the case under consideration the second, and what seems tobe the better view, viz: that such property is exempted only when used bythe grantee for appropriate purposes. Stohl v. Association, 58 Pac. 796,Association v. Pelten, 36 Ohio 258. The second contention would also be sup-ported by the fact that all such exemptions should be strictly construed asthey are in derogation of the equal rights of all.
TRADE NAME-DESCRIPTIVE TERMS-FULLER V. HuFF, 104 Fed. 141.-Thelong continued use of a trade name, even though it is descriptive of quality,
can be protected by injunction and the fact that the packages were dissimilar
in appearance and had the place of manufacture plainly printed on them does
not take it outside of the rule of unfair competition.
This case goes further than any previous case we have seen in regard to
two points. The general rule is that names descriptive of quality can not beprotected as trade-marks. Ginter v. Kinney Tobacco Co., 12 Fed. 182. This
case of Fuller v. Huffiakes a descriptive name which has long been used a
valid trade-mark. This is in accordance with the general tendency of the dayin the development of the law of trade-mark. The other point that althoughthe use of the name was accompanied by simulation of packages and theplaces of manufacture printed on them was different, yet it constitutes unfaircompetition, seems to carry this doctrine further than previous cases. Wehave understood that such a general similarity in appearance as would mis-lead the ordinary purchaser was the best. Lorillard Co. v. Pepper, 86
Fed. 956.
VENDOR AND VENDEE-RECISSION-IMPROVEMENTS.RIGHT TO COMPENSA-
TION-LuTov v. BADHAM, 37 S. E. 133 (N. C.) Held, where a vendee has en-
tered and placed valuable improvements on land under a parol contract to
convey, and the vendor repudiates the contract and refuses to convey, the ven-
dee or his personal representative may maintain an action to recover compen-
sation for such improvements, and the right to such compensation exists
though the vendor has obtained possession.
It seems well settled that where improvemets have been made under parol
contract, compensation will be allowed for them where the party claiming isin possession. Hedgepeth v. Rose, 95 N. C. 41. The present case allows com-pensation after the occupant has given up possession, and in this seems to gobeyond the general rule of the State. Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, second ed.16-103. The judgment seems grounded on a very liberal exercise of equitable
principles.
